Worrying orders of the court

A CASE in the magistrates court on the Isle of Wight should cause concern for reporters covering the courts.

The case, detailed here in Hold the Front Page, concerned neglect of a child, and at an earlier hearing magistrates had imposed a S39 order under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 anonymising the child.

This has the effect of anonymising the mother of the child as well, because you cannot practically report the case in such circumstances and name the mother, because it will lead to the identification of the child.

The Isle of Wight County Press wanted to challenge the order, as it is usually accepted that very young children, in they case they were one and two, are too young to be affected by negative publicity and do not need such an order to be made. This is set out quite clearly in the Judicial College’s publication – Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal Courts – every court reporter should have a copy of it.

However, as is detailed in HTFP, the reporter in court was ‘put off’ by the clerk who said there were no new facts to warrant reconsidering the order. Note to reporters – do not be ‘put off’ insist on the court at least considering your request.

In my view what is concerning about the case though is not the court’s failure to hear the paper’s objection, but it’s reasons for imposing the order in the first place.

The magistrates placing the order were concerned that online publication mean that a very young child might be subject to adverse effects of publicity at some time in the future.

This line of reasoning is not new. I have heard it expressed now a number of times by judges and at Law Commission seminars. There is clearly a concern that the cliche of today’s newspaper being tomorrow’s chip-wrapper no longer holds true and that online archives are changing attitudes.

I expect this issue to emerge again and again in years to come and the media need to come up with a good answer, or the courts will continue to shut down their reporting.

My thanks to Rob Preece @RobPreeceOnline for pointing this case out to me.

Why judges need no further powers

PROPOSALS to give judges far-reaching powers over the media to prevent prejudice to trials are wrong and here are three quick reasons why.

The idea is included in the Law Commission’s consultation on contempt of court and means that judges could order the temporary removal of material from online archives before and during a trial if it might prejudice the case.

I will be submitting a detailed response to the commission’s consultation, but I wanted to set out a brief argument against that specific idea, in the hope it would prompt others in the media to realise the huge burden it will potentially place and on them and prompt them to respond to the consultation as well.

1. If you give judges this sort of power, they will exercise it too widely and too often

Often for the best of reasons, judges make orders which are simply beyond their powers in law. They may do so to preserve a fair trial, or to protect a vulnerable victim or witness, but they overstep what the law says they are allowed to do.

There are countless examples of the misapplication of orders under Section 4 and Section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and Section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.

At the Law Commission symposium held recently to discuss their proposals. One judge attending, unwittingly perhaps, gave a perfect example of this.

He had, he told the audience, been the judge in the trial of two police officers over the Hillsborough disaster. During that trial he had made an order banning publication of any photograph of the memorial to the 96 who died at Hillsborough. He explained that feelings were inflamed at at the time and they needed no further inflammation by publication of such an emotive picture.

There were various nods of approval from the audience when he said this.

The question is, under what power in law did he make such an order? Section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 allows for an order postponing the reporting of an element of a trial, or the entire trial, to prevent prejudice to proceedings. However, it only gives judges the power to postpone reporting of their proceedings, it cannot apply to events outside the court. The Hillsborough Memorial was not part of those proceedings, so ought not to have been subject of any order.

2. The practicalities of removal of material will impose a huge burden on publishers and ultimately render such orders ineffective.

The idea of these orders is that where someone has been the subject of previous proceedings or trials, widely reported, that an order can be made so that those reports are temporarily hidden from public view, so that a juror on their trial will not find them.

They will not work, and here’s why.

The idea is based on the premise that prejudicial material will be easy to find, identify and disable. Things are never that simple, even with the formidable technology at the disposal of publishers.

Let’s take the example of Gary Striker, Premiership footballer, leading goal scorer and well-publicised bad-boy.

Let us say, for simplicity’s sake, that stories about Striker fall into six categories:
1 Sport stories including match reports which feature him
2 Sport stories which feature Striker’s often very serious foul-play
3 News stories featuring Striker’s public appearances that contain innocuous material
4 News stories that detail Striker’s appearances in court on a variety of charges
5 Sport stories that mention his convictions in passing
6 Stories from all of the above, which include readers comments that mention his previous convictions

Let’s say Striker is up on a very serious charge, heading for Crown Court trial and the judge decides to make an order for removal of prejudicial material.

I don’t think any automated programme exists that would differentiate the above categories.

The only way you will be able to sort out the prejudicial from the innocuous is to have people read them, and in the case of someone as famous as Striker, that will mean sifting a vast amount of information. Who will that burden fall upon?

Will the defence, or judge, in seeking, or making an order, be required to specify which stories they want removed?

Or, as I suspect, will the power be to make a general order for removal of prejudicial material, leaving publishers to sift out the benign from the risky.

In a case like that of Striker, that will be almost impossible to achieve in a timely manner.

I do hope that publishers, of both new media and traditional newspaper websites, will respond to the Law Commission proposals and urge a rethink on this issue.

If they don’t, then pity the poor minions who have to weed out every prejudicial mention of Gary Striker.